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REALTY TITLE

CO.

[20 C. (2d)

sale. was usurious, yet it is evident that the trial court did not
include this amount in the payments which it required plaintiff to make in order to redeem his property from the second
deed of trust.
,
, In the "Findings and Judgment" entered by the court in
1;his. ,~ase is the statement and finding that "This court finds
'. "', that . there is now due to defendant Peter O. Weisbrod
from the :p~~i:ti~iff..., .$1,780.21 advanced by said defendant
., .... for the purpose of paying principal and interest on the
d~ed of. trust ( the $5,000 deed of trust) set forth on page 7 of
stipulation, and fire insurance premiums and taxes . . •
a,~d ,9ther charges." The .stipulation of facts shows that defen4/Wt Weisbrod paid out the sum of $1,400.97 on account of taxes
on said real.property and installment payments of principal on
the $5,000 note secured by said first deed of trust, and that he
paid out other miscellaneous amounts, all of which together
with said sum of $145.24, hereinbefore discussed, less a credit
df $140 paid by plaintiff, alnount to the sum 6f $1,780.21, the
amount the court required plaintiff to pay in order to secure
a release of said deed of trust.
Plaintiff objects to the five miscellaneous items amounting
to $374, made up of attorney's fees and foreclosure costs.~.
These expenditures were all authorized by the second deed of
trust and their payment secured by its terms.
Therefore, it appears from this discussion of the judgment
that none of the payments which the plaintiff was required
thereby to make in order to obtain a release of his property
from the lien of the second deed of trust was a part of nor was
any of them in any way affected by any usurious contract to
which the parties hereto may have agreed. It also satisfactorily appears that all items of expenditure to which plaintiff
has objected were authorized by said deed of trust and covered by said stipulation of facts.
The judgment is affirmed.

saier

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Houser, J., Carter, J.,
and Traynor, J., concurred.
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JOHN EGGERT, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PACIFIC
STATES SAVINGS AND LOAN COMPANY et al., Defendants; RALPH W. EVANS, as Building and Loan
Commissioner, etc., et al., Interveners and Respondents;
JESSIE C. KELLEY et al., Appellants; HUGO H. HARRIS et al., Attorneys and Respondents.
[1] Appeal-Persons Entitled to Appeal-Party.-Only a party

to the record can appeal, and persons who are not parties of
record in a representative action but whose names appear only
in an exhibit attached to the complaint and judgment may not
appeal from an order relating to attorneys' fees, although their
attorney appears at the hearing on the petition forpaymelf t
of fees.
[2] Id.-Dismissal-On Court's Own Motion.-An appellate court
may dismiss an improp8r appeal on its own motion, and will
do so where the appellants are not parties to the record, although the motion made is to dismiss as to certain appellants
only.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County fixing attorneys' fees and directing payment
thereof. Henry M. Willis, Judge, Appeal dismissed on motion. Application for writ of supersedeas denied.
Otto A. Ehlers and John C. 'Campbell for Appellants.
Hugo H. Harris, David E. Field and Richard W. Katerndahl in pro. per., Vincent Morgan, Hill, Morgan & Bledsoe,
Guy Richards Crump, Wood, Crump & Rogers, Christian H.
Hartke and H. W. Hoag for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-On October 28, 1938, John Eggert, as a
holder of a Fidelity Definite Term Certificate commenced this
action against the Pacific States Savings and Loan Company
and the State Guaranty Corporation, on behalf of himself
and some 1,500 other certificate holders. The complaint in[2] See 2 Cal. Jur. 765; 3 Am. Jur. 321.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 87; [2] Appeal
and Error, § 921.
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eluded a prayer that plaintiff's attorneys of reeo.rd be allowed
attorneys' fees for filing and prosecuting the action. The
court held the suit a proper class action, and in its judgment
for Eggert and the other certificate holders who!!! he repr('sented decreed that they recover from the defendant Pacific
States Savings and Loan Company the sum of $1,851,740.95
to be apportio·ned pro rata among them after deduction of
expenses and fees. The court expressly reserved jurisdiction
to determine the fees to be paid plaintiff's attorneys. The
complaint and the judgment incorporated by reference an
exhibit containing the names of the holders of the outstanding certificates and the number and face value of the certificates held by them.. The names of Jessie C. Kelley and Dorothy C. Given appeared in the exhibit. The court appointed
a receiver to facilitate the collection and payment of the judg'ment. The court also made an urder, directed to plaintiff and
all other persons interested, to show cause why it should not
make an order ,fixing reasonable attorneys' fees. Notice of the
order was published daily until the return date. The court
fixed the fees of plaintiff's attorneys at 15 per cent of the
total recovery, excluding the share of the Building and Loan.:)
Commissioner. Subsequently 'Eggert petitioned for an order
direetjng. the rec.eiver. to obtain and turn over the balance of
the money due to him and the other certificate holders after
deducting the 15 per cent allowed the attorneys. At the hearing on this petition John C. Campbell, representing Jessie C.
Kelley and Dorothy C. Given, Definite Term Certificate Holders, appeared and objected to the granting of the petition
insofar as it concerned the payment to the attorneys. The
court made an order granting the petition, however, and
Jess~e C. Kelley and Dorothy C. Given filed a notice of appeal
for themselves and all other holders of Fidelity Definite Term
Certificates not otherwi."Ie represented by counsel from the
order fixing the amount of the attorneys' fees and from the
order directing the receiver to pay to plaintiff's attorneys
15 per cent of the amount ,recovered by the holders of the
Fidelity Definite' Term Certificates. They also petitioned this
court for a writ of supersedeas to stay the execution of these
orders until the determination of their appeal. Plaintiff
Eggert and his attorneys have moved that the appeal be dismissed as to all certificate holders other than Jessie C. Kelley
and Dorothy C. Given.
[1] The motion to dismiss the appeal is properly made, for
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it is a settled rule of practice in this state that only a party to
the record can appeal. (Elliott v. S~tperior Court; 1,44 Cal. .501
[77 P::tc. 1109, 103 Am. St. Rep. 102J; Brau,n v. Brown, 13
Cal. (2d) 130 [87 P. (2d) 1009J; Estate of M·cDermott, 127·
Cal. 450 [5!J Pac. 783]; Estate of Crooks, 125 Cal. 459 [58
Pac. 89]; ~1ltpeter v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 22 Cal.
App. 63, 66 [133 Pac. 329].) Appellants were not named as,
parties to the action nor did they take any appropriate stepsto become parties to the record. The fact that their names· and
the extent of their interest in the action appeared in an exhibit attached to the complaint and· the judgmerit did not
make them parties to the record. (See Estate of McDougald"
143 Cal. 476 [77 Pac. 443] ; Estate of Kent, 6 Cal. (211) 154
[57 P. (2d) 1)01].) Although their attorney appeared at the
hearing Oll the petition for the payment of the money !o
plaintiff's attorneys and objected to such payment, he did
not ask that appellants be made parties, nor did the court
order them brought into the action. (See Pomeroy, Code Rem-.
edies, (5th ed.) 445, sec. 293.) Appellants had ample opportunity even after tho court had made itS orders to become
parties of record by moving to vacate the orders to which
they objected. They could then have appealed from the order
denying the motion. (Elliott v. Superior Court, supra.)
[2J Since appellants have no standing to appeal, it is un-.
necessary to consider their right to appeal in a representative'
capacity on behalf of other certificate holders. The motion
to dismiss the appeal was made only as to certificate holders
other than Jessie C. Kelley and Dorothy C. Given, but this
court may· dismiss an improper appeal on its own motion.
(See cases cited in 2 Cal. Jur. 765; 4 C. J. S. 1981.) The
appeal is therefore dismissed as to all appellants.
As appellants have no rig-ht to appeal, the application for
a writ of supersedeas to stay the execution of the orders for
the payment of attorneys' fees to respondents pending the
appeal is denied.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., eoncurred.

